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BEYOND SYMBOLISM - THE POLITICS OF ASSETS DECLARATION
AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA
Agaptus l{wozorl
Assets declqrotion requirement is a cardinal tool/br the promotion of integrie in
the public service. Thefi/th schedule of the 1999 I'ligerian constitution elaborately
encases a code of condtrctfor all public fficials. This code of conduct provision is
an important constitutional bulwark to rein in the temptation qssociated with the
abuse oJ'one s fficial positionforprivate gains. Butwhat is highly doubful is the
sincerity of the custodians of power to allow the code to have its.full course and
impact. Consistent -*ith elite preoccupation tyith class survival, several hurdles
appear to have been placed on the path of assets declaration requirement with
the result that it has not served as q disincentive to unwholesome practices in the
public domain as it ought to have done. The supervisory institution set up by the
constitution, the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) seems to be hamstrung by certain
systemic inadequacies. This paper examines these systemic inadequacies that
undermine the effectiveness of assets declqration mechanism in l{igeria's public
domain. It concludes that the conversion ofpublic fficeJbr personal gains is still
rife. This is compounded by the deliberate elite conspiracy to shield completed
assets declarationforms (CADFs) and treat the institutional incapacity of CCB
with not iceabl e i ndifference.
INTRODUCTION high potentiality as a "whistle- blower"
as it keeps tab on every public official
and enables a critical examination of the
trajectory of personal accumulation. Such
a mechanism discourages wanton abuse
of office that often manifested in single-
minded looting of the Commonwealth.
Under Nigeria's assets declaration provision,
public officials are expected to declare their
assets on assumption of, and exit from,
office. While it is not designed to be a
punitive strategy, it places a searchlight
on public officials with the ultimate aim
of ensuring a high integrity quotient for
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In Nigeria, assets declaration mechanism
is a constitutional component of the code
of conduct for public ottcials. The 1999
Nigerian constihrtion explicitly provided
for every public official to "submit to the
Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) a written
declaration of all his properties. assers.
and liabilities and those of his urunarried
children under the age of eighteen years"
(Fifth Schedule, Paft 1, Sec. 1l(1), 1999
Nigerian Constitution). The importance of
assets declaration in nudging up the integrity
system within a state is anchored on its
them. In spite of the elaborate institutional
frameworks put in place to administer,
investigate and recommend defaulters of
assets declaration to the Code of Conduct
Tribunal (CCT) for trial, the Code of
Conduct Bureau has performed under
average as exemplified by massive evidence
of looting by government officials between
7999 and2007. The Economic andFinancial
Crimes Commission (EFCC) revealed that
since 1999 political office holders had looted
US$100 billion from public coffers (Daily
Independent 1 8 I 09 I 2006).
The seeming failure of assets declaration
strategy in reining in abuse of office in the
public domain in Nigeria is not an indictment
on its efficacy but attributable to the several
hurdles put on its operational path by the
ruling elite. In spite of the burgeoning
number of govemment officials which u,as
made possible by democratic governance.
there was no commensurate increment
in the number of staff to administer and
investigate assets declaration forms. The
effect was that the constitutional provision
that assets declaration forms be completed
"immediately after taking oftrce,, has been
obeyed in the breach. In addition to that,
the Nigerian Senate has been lethargic in
giving legal backing to public access to
completed assets declaration forms.
This paper argues that these two major
shortcomings of assets declaration
administration in Nigeria have imbued the
public official with certain confldence that
has exacerbated coruption and infused
doubts about the sincerity of the govemment
to enthrone a worthy integrity system. The
paper further contends that unless the
necessary political will is summoned and
channelled to the enthronement of good
goveffrance practices, assets declaration
provision will be a mere emblematic
signpost ofgood intentions with the erection
of the integrity system necessary for a




The central idea behind the erection of
constitutional structures to enthrone a
regime of accountability and transparency
was to subvert corruption and open the
floodgate of "wholesome dividends of
democracy in terms of the greatest good
for the greatest numbers,, (Okore 2003:x).
Assets declaration connotes the legal and
constitutional requirements for public
officials to declare their wealth and assets
either upon entry into public service or
promotion into a position with potential
for illicit enrichment (Chene 200g). Asante
(2005) asserts that assets declaration law
is one of the most effective compliance
mechanisms adopted by nations to prevent
or curb the incidence of conflict of interests
among public office holders. A credible and
effective assets declaration regime has dual
advantages: it complements the ensemble
of rules and structures necessary for
democratic govemance and it is good fbr
the public official as it protects his prir ate
assets from wrongful and extra_1esa1
confiscation as well presen/e his rnte_eritr
(Gyimah-Boadi 2005 : 1 ).
The defunct 1979 Nigerian consritution
pioneered the constitutional baseline for
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code of conduct for public officials' The
cument constitution of Nigeria, the 1999
constitution contains identical provisions'
Assets declaration requirement appears a
cardinal weapon to beat public officials into
line. One, it tends to serve as a mirtor of the
integrity system. TWo, it aims to regulate
the conduct of public officials and thus
decelerate the incidence of comrption' And,
three, it places the worth of public officials in
the public domain to enable public scrutiny
and whistle-blowing on comrpt enrichment'
The Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT) was
set up as a corollary of CCB to administer the
"killer bite" on contraveners. The Nigerian
Constitution offers deflnitional interpretation
of "assets" to mean "any property, movable
and immovable and incomes owned by a
person" (Section 19, Partl, Fifth Schedule,
1999 Nigerian Constitution). Parl II of
the Fifth Schedule of the 1999 Nigerian
Constitution lists in detail who it recognizes
as a public officer.
An analysis of the assets declaration
provision shows that the Nigerian
constitution envisaged that every person
in the emPloY of government should
declare their assets. In other words, assets
declaration requirement for public officials
is non-discriminatory in application' But
in reality the CCB has not been able to
implement this. This great dereliction of
duty seemingly exacerbated comrption' As
Alhaji Kaita lamented:
Comrption is now institutionahzed in
Nigeria. People fraudulently display
ill-gotten wealth and move about in
flashy cars. You see an officer on Grade
level 08 ridding(sic) big Mercedes
Benz cars, you would see somebodY
earning N10,000.00 and building N10
million house to live in. (Cited in
Nwala 1997:172).
The CCB blames its shortcomings in
executing its mandate on institutionai
incapacity. As Sam Saba, its then Secretary
admitted, "though assets declaration is
a constitutional provision for all public
officers irrespective of status in service'
the Bureau had for logistic reasons pegged
the requirements to declare as it found
convenient" (www'icac.org.hk/news "' )
The Bureau had at inception concentrated
on officers on Grade level 14 and above'
that is, management cadre and later
officers on Grade level 07 upwards'
The seeming inability of the Bureau to
effectively discharge its mandate resulted
in the setting up of several ad hoc bodies'
While Ekanem (2003:60) believes that
such ad hoc arrangements were politicall.v
and strategically calculated to paint
glorious image of regimes, Bello-lmam
(2004) contends that the creation of new
institutional structures to tackle new ethical
issues as well as implement extant code of
ethics in the public senrice domain was an
incontroverlible pointer to the failure of
the Bureau. Mohammed Yakubu puts it
forcefullY when he laments that:
The enforcement of the Code"'has
been far below standard. ..in fact one is
forced to believe that there is no code
of conduct for anybody at all. People
conduct themselves in public offrce and
business as if there is no code' Briberl'
and cormption is rampant everywhere'
The few who maY attempt to observc
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,i. result was a free reign of public office
',,se. For instance, in 1992 the Financial
Ires reported that ,.... three hundred
:erians own over US$30 billion in: .;-opean and North American banks...
rCited in Ijewere 1999:253). Creating
--rrde of conduct for public oftcials in
rolity appears to be the lirst and indeed
-. easy paft; the difficult aspects seem to
: the enforcement and implementation
extant provisions of the law; and the
:Lrlcation of the ethics of accountabilitv in
' ,.blic service through proactive strategies.
re Nigerian experience has shown
:t enforcement and implementation of'-iblic accountability ethos can neither be
,-irieved outside of a competent corps of
:1l-motivated stafl-: there is a disjuncture
:-tween optimal personnel requirement
:td the Bureau's actual staff strength; nor
, rthout the involvement of the masses
rough "whistle-b1owing,,. The Bureau
) at a crossroads; a kind ofthe devil and
-: deep blue sea as it lacks the capacity to
r:,1-cute its mandate and yet it is expected to. :o. As the CCB Annual Report (2004:36)
.rSertS, "the Bureau since inception has
.:appled with the problem created by
.,r \'0fi1l r1€fl t embargo on staff recruitment,,.
. ne response of Obasanjo,s government
iren the sifuation became very critical and
- rnost paralyzed activities in the Bureau
-as to authorize the recruitment of staff
rr skeletal services. A non_performing
3ureau, ofcourse, serves the best interesi
i politicians and other public offlcials as
-rerr loots tended to be unchallenged.
the code appear odd and are resented.





Ideally, the Bureau requires for
effectiveness, about 1,200 personnel to
man its various departments and offices
in its headquafters at Abuja and thirtv_six
(36) state-offlces but has not been able
to attain this flgure (CCB Annual Reporl
2004).In fact from2004,the Bureau,s total
strength of B l3 staff plumm eted to 772
staff in 2006 (CCB Annual Reporl 2006).
A combination of l.actors accounted for
the contraction in staff strength: one was
embargo placed on staff recruitment; two
was retirement, resignation and dismissal
of workers without replacement; three was
inadequate funding of the Bureau and for.r
was the categorization of the Bureau as
pafi of the civil sen.ice of the federation.
The last point has its own demerits.
There is this perception of unseriousness
associated with the civil service in Nigeria:
duties are performed in such imprecise
and lackadaisical manner that the civil
service is generally regarded as corrupt,
incompetent and inefficient (Omoleke
2003:191). Being categorized as cir,.il
service, there was no special incentir.e or
separate salary structure to motivate the
staff of the Bureau: the other agencies
fighting comrption such as the Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC.)
and the Independent Corrupt practices
and other Related Offences Commission
(ICPC) enjoy enhanced salan. allou ances
(CCB Anxual Reporl 200.1:3 7 ).
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The 1999 Constitution confers on the
Bureau the responsibility of administering,
processing and safekeeping of assets
declaration forms by public officials' This
responsibility is part of the overall task
of establishing and maintaining a high
standard of morality and accountability
amongst public officials in the conduct of
government business. The staff constraints
suffered by the Bureau made it impossible
to enforce prompt compliance with the
provisions ofassets declaration' Thus, the
assets declaration forms (ADFs) issued out
were not promptly received in accordance
with the mles: out of 8,839 ADFs issued in
2006, only 2.46 1 ADFs were received (CCB
Ministerial Press Briefing2001)' The rest
were probably received years later' These
delays created loopholes for "would-be
comtpt officers" as it provided room for the
legitimization of anticipatory declaration
of assets as well as emboldened non-
compliance. The operational inadequacies
of the Bureau opened the floodgate of crisis
of discipline and accountability; the twin-
crisis that the Political Bureau identifled
as "'the two most serious problems, which
have confronted the Nigerian political
process since independence" (CCB Annual
Report 2004.2)-
Part of the strategies used by successive
military regimes to decelerate the
momentum of the Btrreau was the non-
release of funds to carry out its operations'
This strategy remained in place even in
the post-military era between 2000 and
2003, making it impossible for the Bureau
to be effective in discharging its mandate'
Democratic rule increased the operationa
needs of the Bureau. As the CCB Annua
Report (2004: 4) obser-ves :
Democratic goveffiance has brougil'
about an increased number of publi'
officers at all levels of governmetl'
for Assets Declaration. This has ptr'
additional pressure on the fesources
of the Bureau (personnel, logistics
funds) for administration of Asset'
Declaration on all political offic;
holders who, constitutionallY, mus
declare their assets before assumin-:
office.
And yet there was no correlational increas'
between the increasing number of pubh'
office holders on whom assets declaratior-
forms would be administered and th'
number of staff to administer them' Indee':
there was an increasing gap betweet-
what the Bureau needed for oPtima
performance and what it actually had' Nc
even the budgetary allocation to the Burea.''
improved in any significant way to gi\ '
room for ingenious expansion ofpersonne.
base either through consultancy or ad hoc
affangement.
The Table 1 above shows a progressl\ -
increment in the personnel allocations
The increment in the allocation does no
suggest increment in the number of staffii
the Bureau. The increment was a responsi
to the reforms in the public service whic;'
the government called monetization as
well as promotions and yearly increment'
to staff salaries.
AJPAM Vo1 XXI. No. 1 & 2 ' January/Ju1y 20ts2
Table 1: BudgetaryAllocation to the Code of Conduct Bureau
* The flgure covers January March 2007
Source. CCB Annual Reports, Various issues.
The Table 2 above shows a consistent
depletion in the number of staff without
addition since 2004. The minimum staff
requirement for near-optirnal performance
of the Bureau has been projected to be
1,200. The Bureau has never approached
this number since its inception parlicularly
from 2004, the period in which we could
gather data. From a combination of
statutory retirement, resignatron and
death, the number of staff has been on
the downward trend reflecting increased
gaps between optimal staff strength and
actual staff strength. While the difference
in 2004 was 387, it increased to 423
and 428 for 2005 and 2006 respectively.
The discrepancy between the Bureau,s
actual and ideal staff strength led to
rneffectiveness in the administration of
assets declaration requirement. it led to
slow processing of assets declaration forms
as well as shyness in the invocation of
punishment on defaulters. This scenario led
Nwala (1 997 :169);Agalamanyi (2003 :3 1 0)
to undermine the Bureau,s relevance in
instilling a sense of accountability in the
Nigerian public serice.






Source: CCB Annual Reports 2004:36;2005:3g; 2006:21
Year Personnel Cost Overhead Cost Capital
2000 133,t23,4t2.00 46,626.101.10 1
2001 209,357 ,145 .00 140,028,960.35 31,875,000.00
2002 199,t07,072.00 42,123,t58.94 NfI
2003 217.959,058.00 85,855,7,s2.97 Nil
2004 334,464,355.00 150,000,000.00
2005 327,081,128.00 13 6,1,13,753.00
2006 3,10,692,089.00 276,728,95s.00 257,578,653TO
2007* 55.125.7 54.00 88,524,512.00 75,000,000.oo
Year Actual Staff





2005 777 36 1200
2006 772 5 1 200
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Table 3 : As sets D eclaration Form Admini stration
The differences betr.veen the nominal
received (i.e. total number of eligible
public offlcers to be issued with assets
declaration forms) and assets declaration
forms actually issued as recorded in Table
3 show that the Bureau has consistently
flouted the time limit provided in the
Constitution and its Act. For instance, in
2000, the Bureau issued ADFs to 90,554
as against the nominal flgure of 8,682. The
reason was that it carried over the ADFs
that would have been issued in 1999 to
2000. In 2001 when the Bureau would have
issued out 504,151 forms it was able to
distribtrte 282,17 5 forms. Those who were
not accommodated in 2001 were issued
with the form in 2002 hence the higher
number of fotms issued in contradistinction





The same trend is observable in 2003 al-
2004 where the number of assets declaratic,:
forms issued was less than the number in t1t.
nominal roll. Thus between 2000 and 200-
assets declaration forms were issued to *
total of 145,050 out of 1,063,849 lear-in-:
out 318,799 persons. The Bureau has nc,
been able to match its distribution of assets
declaration forms with the nominal receir e:
for ministries, departments and agencie.
(MDA). The lack of promptness on the par .
of the Bureau created certain negativities
assets declaration requirements became .-
hollow ritual as public officials themseh.e.
determined the datelines for collectior-.
completion and submission of CADFs.
There are two dimensions to the effectwhich
inadequate personnel have had upon the fight
orns
Table 4: State Operations (36 States and FCT)
Federal Operafions
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to enthrone public accountability and high
moral standard in the conduct of govemment
business. One, it created a lacuna which
enabled public officers, especially political
office holders, to get acchmatized with
the system and thus corruptly enriched
themselves even before the assets declaration
forms were administered upon them. Two,
the discrepancies evident in the yearly
entries suggested that the provision of the
law stipulating thirty (30) days for the
. return of completed assets declaration forms
(CADFs) was hardly held sacrosanct.
The failure of the Bureau to enforce the
provisions of assets declaration within
the limits of the law introduced some
interpretative confltsion. While the law setting
up assets declaration stipulated that public
olficers should, on assumption of office, fill
the assets declaration form and submit same,
most public office holders did not fulfil this
provisionuntil much later intheirtenure with
no sanctions imposed upon them. This is
attributable to the Bureau's narrow de nition
of a defaulter as exemplified by the negligible
number ofpeople declared defaulters. Going
by the 1999 Nigerian constitution, defaulters
should include those public officers who
tail to declare their assets immediately after
taking office or fail to return their completed
,rssets declaration forms within 3Odays of
collection.
Several things are wrong with the Bureau
rvhich made it difficult for it to take a
hard-line posture on strict adherence to
the provisions of assets declaration. First,
up till now, only public officers on Grade
I-evels 07 and above are covered by the
lssets declaration requirements even when
the constitution does not exempt anybody
inthe employ of govemment. Second, there
is no authentication mechanism in place to
constantly keep a tab on the declarations
by public officials. This knorvledge had
led to abuse and perfunctoriness in asset
declaration by public officials.
ELITE AND CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY: THE POLITICS
OF EXCLUSION IN ASSETS
DECLARATION
Assets declaration is an official attestation
by an individual in public selice detailing
his,4rer worth materially. Assets declaration
serves some other pulposes: it provides a
"calibrative" basis against which the integrity
level of a public offi.cer could be adjudged
or measured. Assets declaration puts the
public officer on an integ:ity scale. Because
people who occttpy public offices do not
live rn isolation but are paft and parcel of the
society, ther activities are not enamoured of
people's prying eyes. In authoritarian and
unaccountable regimes, the public might see
andhearbut are forbidden, through draconian
decrees, to talk. Even institutions empowered
by law to act are restrained from doing so
through reprisals on the top echelons of
such institutions. But in democracy, the story
ought to be different. The special features of
democratic govemments (namely, rule of
law, accountability and the sovereignfv of
the people being the anchor of govemnent)
compel public officials to submit themselr-es to
cerlain irreducible standards of accorurtabriiq-
and morality in govemment business.
Thus, the creation of assets declaration
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accountability in govemance constitutes
a requirement which public officers must
adhere to. The general underlying idea
behind assets declaration is that public
officers provide economic information
about themselves. As Chene (200g:2)
observes, "assets declaration schemes
generate baseline information against
which later disclosure can be compared to
identify which wealth is not attributable to
income, gift and loans. . . ". The usefulness
of assets declaration as a bulwark against
personal exploitation of public office lies
in the feedback mechanism put in place
by the system. One of such mechanisms is
public access to assets declaration records.
Luh (2003:3) puts it succinctly:
...allowing public access to offlcials,
declarations greatly enhances the value
of an asset-declaration scheme. public
access to declarations facilitates public
scrutiny of government and govemment
officials, backs up enforcement of the
declaration requirements, and promotes
public confldence in the declaration
system and the govemment.
The 1999 Nigerian Constitution recognizes
the need for public access to assets
declaration records and therefore provides
that "the Bureau shall have power to retain
custody of such fassets] declarations
[made by public offlcers] and make them
available for inspection by any citizen of
Nigeria on such terms and conditions as
the National Assembly may prescribe',
(S.3(c), Part l, Third Schedule, 1999
Nigerian Constitution). But since 1999,
the National Assembly has neither proposed
nor stipulated modalities forpublic access to
assets declaration records. A maj or constrair I
in allowrng public access to assets declaratiol
records was the erroneous categorization
of assets declaration records as officiai
documents protected u,ithin the ambit anc
contemplation of Official Secrets Act, a relic
of Nigeria's colomal past. The recourse to this
categorization has nevertheless served the
"uselirl" pulpose of shielding govemment
officials from public scrutiny. The Officia.
SecretsAct Cap 335, Laws ofthe Federation
ofNigeria 1990 prohibits public officials fronr
disclosing official and classifled information
to the public.
Hiding under the umbrella of Official
Secrets Act, public oflrcials had made theu.
activities impervious to public knowledge. To
counteract the inaccessi bility of information
occasioned by this Act, proposals were senr
to the National Assembly for the enactrnent
of freedom of information (FOI) laws. The
ruling elites played roulette with the Bill
stalling it either at the National Assembll
or at the presidency. There is no gainsaying
the gains of liberalizing and dismantling the
secrecy surounding govemment business.
Open access to CADFs would decelerate the
incidence of comrption through its potential
to expose as well as dissuade (poroznuk
2005).
Even though Obasanjo developed a code
of conduct for his ministers and special
advisers, his govemment lacked the political
will to champion the implementation of the
constitutional provision ofaccess to CADFs.
One could say that this lack of access suited
the economic interests of Obasanjo and
the ruling class. This assertion is based
on two issues of misconduct perpetrated
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by Obasanjo: the use of state apparatus
to raise funds for his private library and
the acquisition of shares in Transnational
Corporation (Transcorp), a private company,
while in office. Because the constitutional
provision empowering citizens' access
to CADFs had not been effected by the
National Assembly, no individual possessed
the locus standi in law to initiate prosecution
either to access these CADFs or force the
Code of Conduct Bureau to act.
Unconfi.rmed reporls had insinuated that
Obasanjo in 1999 was at the brink of
bankruptcy but in 2006 his other company
(Obasanjo Holdings), which was hitherto
unknown, donated a whooping N100
million to support Obasanjo's library project
(Ejinkonye 2006; Ayoboiu 2006). The
speculations which surrounded these events
would not have arisen were people aliowed
access to assets declaration by public
officials. In spite ofthe Bureau's aggressive
public enlightenment to encourage the
public to assist it with information for the
success of its activities through complaints
on any perceived conflicts of interest and
coffupt enrichment (CCB Annual repoft
2006:3), the volume of petition has been
abysmally low in a countrywhere comrption
is considered ubiquitous.
Both concrete and anecdotal evidence since
1999 suggested an increment in both the
Table 5: Data on Petitions Received









Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2000-2007 http:/irv-wrv.
transparency. olg/policy_research,/surveys_indices/cpil
* CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and countn analr sts and
ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Although there has been improvement in the CPI Scerre since
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*2007 entry covers January - March
Source'. CCB Ministerial Press Briefing 2007:14.
incidence and pervasiveness of corruption
amongst public officials yet only a total of
796 petitions were received from the public
by the Bureau between 2004 and March
2007. The Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission (EFCC) revealed that since
1999 political office holders had looted
US$100bi1lion from public coffers (Daily
Independent I 8/09/2006).
The crisis of public accountability and
eroded moraiity in public service are
products of high level exploitation of
systemic contradictions and flaws. As
has been noted earlier, the shield of
Official SecretsAct whose utility lay in the
exclusion of public eyes from govem.ment
and its activities created a perfect scenario
for the blossoming of culture of impunity
amongst public officers. This culture
spawned four mechanisms through which
the elaborate structure of maintaining "a
high standard ofmorality and accountability
in public service" had been subverted
namely, operation of ghost accounts under
pseudonyms, anticipatory declaration, the
use of fronts and cronies outside the ties
of consanguinity and minimal declaration.
Anticipatory declaration, according to
Justice Emmanuel Ayoola, the Chairman
of Independent and Corrupt Practices
and other Related Oft-ences Commission
(ICPC), connotes a situation where:
Assets declaration fbrm is filled up
with assets [which] the public official
hopes to acquire while in office with a
corruption margin drawn in the fonn.
lf the public oftcial has two cars on
assumption of office, he could declare
six, and in due course he buys the
additional four cars or he could record
a vacant plot of land as a fully built up.,
structure.
When the declaration is finally checked
after months or years, the assets
would have been put in place (wwri
anticoruptionleague. org)
The scenario pointed out by Justice Ayoola
is made possible where public access to
CADFs is straitjacketed in thick layers oi'
officialdom. Ekpu (2005:2-3) contends
that lack of access to CADFs not onlr
stymiedthe flght against comrptionbut also
undemrined the Code of Conduct Tribunal
(CCT) reducing it to "less than tribune ol
the people". It is only when people har.e
access to concrete data that they can be
helpful in contributing information relevant
to uncovering col-l-upt enrichment in all its
ramifications and manifestations, including
the operation ofghost bank accounts and
the use ol f,ronts and cronies.
Another strategy through which public
olficers exploit the secrecy in assets
declaration regime is what has been termed
minimal declaration. As Nwanma (2007)
explains, minimal declaration denotes a
situation "where an incumbent official,
for fear of arousing curiosity, chooses to
declare just parl of his total assets". This
kind of scenario is possible with people
who had been in the corridors of power
for a long time. The only way through
which these various strategies could
be immobilized is the liberalization of
access to assets declaration records of
public officials. Legal frameworks that
are bereft of this impoftant provision can
158 AJPAM Vol XXI, No. 1 & 2 . January/July 2010
